This statement concerns the recovery of assets by Belgium that originated from bribes allegedly extorted by Gulnara Karimova, daughter of the former President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, from telecommunications companies operating in the country. In March 2025, a Brussels court ordered the confiscation of $216 million held in accounts at the local branch of the Bank of New York Mellon. Subsequently, Belgium’s Central Agency for Seizure and Confiscation allocated half of this amount to the Belgian treasury and transferred the other half to the government of Uzbekistan – directly and without any safeguards or conditions to prevent potential misuse. In our view, this decision violates Chapter V of the UN Convention Against Corruption, as well as the principles of responsible and accountable asset return endorsed by the 2017 Global Forum on Asset Recovery. Through this statement, we urge the Belgian authorities to ensure that not half, but the full amount of confiscated assets is returned to Uzbekistan in a manner that guarantees the funds are used transparently and in the best interests of the Uzbek people, the true victims of corruption.

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According to the Belgian press, at the end of March 2025, a Brussels court ruled to confiscate more than $200 million that had been frozen in Belgian bank accounts in connection with a money laundering case involving multimillion-dollar bribes extorted from telecommunications companies operating in Uzbekistan. Following the court’s decision, Belgium’s Central Agency for Seizure and Confiscation (COIV) transferred €100.4 million (US$108 million) to Uzbekistan, with an equal amount allocated to the Belgian state treasury.

While the court’s confiscation order is a welcome step, the way in which Belgian authorities have handled the distribution of the seized assets raises serious concerns.

This decision by COIV raises far more questions than the asset return to Uzbekistan in a separate case involving Switzerland. That case concerned illicit funds linked to Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of former Uzbek President Islam Karimov and her associates that were confiscated by the Swiss authorities. Switzerland returned $131 million of these assets to Uzbekistan in 2022, and another tranche of $182 million followed in February 2025.

Corruption researcher Alisher Ilkhamov has assessed the Swiss-Uzbek asset return process, noting both its merits and shortcomings. He argues that, while the current Swiss-Uzbek process marks progress compared to Kazakhstan’s second asset return in 2012 (worth $48 million), it falls short of the first case in 2007, in which $115 million was repatriated to Kazakhstan. Two international organizations, IREX and Save The Children, were awarded the right to manage this fund following an open tender. The Bota Foundation, in turn, directed the amount transferred to it to a program to support poor families and their children.

So, what exactly is the problem with the way the Belgian authorities handled the confiscated assets obtained through bribery from telecommunications companies in Uzbekistan?

Our assessment is based on two main criteria: first, the UN Convention against Corruption, particularly Chapter 5 on asset recovery; and second, the principles set forth by the Global Forum for Asset Recovery in its December 2017 Communiqué.

These two frameworks are complementary and, in our view, should both guide decisions on the repatriation of assets acquired through corruption.

In this context, several key questions arise.

First and foremost, we are deeply concerned by Belgium’s decision to allocate half of the confiscated assets ($108 million) to its own state treasury.

This move appears to be in direct violation of Article 57, Section 5 of the UN Convention against Corruption, which clearly states that recovered assets should be returned to the party with legitimate rights to them – namely, the country of origin. While the bribes were extorted from the telecom companies, it was the people of Uzbekistan who were ultimately harmed by this large-scale corruption. Accordingly, the entirety of these funds should be returned to the Uzbek people as compensation for the damage they endured.

What remains unclear is the legal or moral basis on which Belgian authorities chose to appropriate such a significant portion of these assets. The amount retained far exceeds any reasonable operational costs associated with the asset confiscation process. This decision is difficult to justify under international law and evokes troubling parallels with colonial-era practices. As a former colonial power, Belgium’s appropriation of foreign assets – particularly from a country outside Europe – can be seen as echoing historic patterns of exploitation in Asia, Africa, and South America. From the standpoint of both international legal norms and principles of social justice, this action is indefensible.

Perhaps Belgian authorities believe they are entitled to reward themselves for having prevented money laundering? However, the available data tell a different story. The initial asset freeze involving Gulnara Karimova was not initiated by Belgian prosecutors, but rather by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). In 2014, the DOJ requested that Belgium freeze assets discovered in accounts held at the Brussels branch of the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY), as part of its investigation and forthcoming civil forfeiture lawsuit against Karimova’s assets.

The assets in question were held in the following accounts in the Bank of New York Mellon’s Brussels branch:

  • On behalf of First Global Investments SPC Limited’s “AAA Rated Fixed Income Of Developed Economies Segregated Portfolio,” Fund ID: AAARATEDFIX01
    • Accounts: 102162418400, 102162418260, 102162419780
  • On behalf of Single Funds Segregated Portfolio, Fund ID: FGISINGLE01, CID: 3178750045
    • Accounts: 102165527100, 102165528400, 102165529780
  • On behalf of Hedge Fund Of Funds Segregated Portfolio, Fund ID: HEDGEFOFS01, CID: 3178750029
    • Accounts: 102165517100, 102165518400, 102165519780

These hedge funds were allegedly part of a broader network used to launder illicit proceeds obtained through bribery involving telecom companies operating in Uzbekistan.

On the 6th of January 2016, the DOJ formally filed a lawsuit to seize these and other assets (also including funds frozen in accounts in Ireland and Luxembourg). The case was submitted to the US Southern District Court Of New York, which referred the matter to out-of-court negotiations between the DOJ and the Government of Uzbekistan – both of whom had claims to the assets in question. The DOJ’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative was leading this effort on behalf of the U.S. government.

In December 2024, the parties to the negotiations reached a settlement, based on which the Southern District Court of New York requested the transfer of seized assets to the United States from the countries where they had been frozen – Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg. DOJ represented by the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative intended after this transfer to the US initiate repatriation of these assets to Uzbekistan, allocating them to the UN Trust fund.

However, in a memorandum dated February 2, 2025, the U.S. Attorney General’s Office announced the disbandment of the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative unit. As a result, there is currently no designated unit within DOJ responsible for overseeing the Karimova case, which means there are no guarantees that the assets once transferred to the US will be then repatriated to Uzbekistan, as there is now a risk that the assets will be instead appropriated into the US Treasury.

The Belgian Attorney General’s Office appears to have seized this situation to take unilateral control of the assets and proceed with their confiscation, bypassing DOJ involvement. Unfortunately, following a court ruling authorizing confiscation, Belgian authorities decided to appropriate half of the assets into the national treasury and transfer the other half to the government of Uzbekistan—without implementing any safeguards to prevent their potential misappropriation.

This approach fails to uphold the principles of fair and just asset recovery. Instead of adhering to the best international standards in this sphere, the Belgian authorities seem to have prioritized their own national interests at the expense of legal norms and the rights of corruption victims in Uzbekistan.

It is also a matter of concern that the Belgian authorities transferred the other half of the confiscated sum – amounting to $108 million – to the Government of Uzbekistan without imposing any preconditions or safeguards. This action stands in clear violation of the Global Forum for Asset Recovery (GFAR) principles for responsible asset restitution.

In particular, the following core GFAR principles appear to have been disregarded:

  • Principle 4: Transparency and accountability. Transferring and receiving countries will guarantee transparency and accountability in the return and disposition of recovered assets. Information on the transfer and administration of returned assets should be made public and be available to the people in both the transferring and receiving country. The use of unspecified or contingent fee arrangements should be discouraged.
  • Principle 5: Beneficiaries. Where possible, and without prejudice to identified victims, stolen assets recovered from corrupt officials should benefit the people of the nations harmed by the underlying corrupt conduct.
  • Principle 6: Strengthening anti-corruption and development. Where possible, in the end use of confiscated proceeds, consideration should also be given to encouraging actions which fulfill the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) principles of combating corruption, repairing the damage done by corruption, and achieving development goals.
  • Principle 9: Preclusion of Benefit to Offenders. All steps should be taken to ensure that the disposition of confiscated proceeds of crime do not benefit persons involved in the commission of the offence(s).
  • Principle 10: Inclusion of non-government stakeholders. To the extent appropriate and permitted by law, individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community based organizations, should be encouraged to participate in the asset return process, including by helping to identify how harm can be remedied, contributing to decisions on return and disposition, and fostering transparency and accountability in the transfer, disposition and administration of recovered assets.

This disregard of the GFAR principles will likely nullify the potential positive impact of the asset restitution to Uzbekistan. At the very least, there is no basis to speak of accountability in the use of the returned assets, as the Government of Uzbekistan itself lacks genuine accountability to its citizens – free and fair elections have never been held in the country.

There is a significant risk that the Uzbek authorities will use the repatriated funds to serve the personal interests of the ruling elite and their associates. Despite some reforms under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, state corruption, nepotism, conflicts of interest, favouritism and rent seeking remain systemic and widespread. While extreme forms of corruption such as extorting multimillion-dollar bribes from foreign investors, common during the Islam Karimov regime, have become less visible, recent RFE/RL journalistic investigations have identified at least eight cases of high-level corruption under Mirziyoyev’s leadership, including some allegedly involving members of his own family.

According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, Uzbekistan ranked 121st out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting a persistently high level of corruption in this country. In this context, the likelihood is high that the returned assets could once again be diverted or misused, contributing to a new cycle of corruption.

This raises broader questions about the role of the European Union and whether it has developed a sufficiently robust policy on asset recovery – especially concerning the return of assets to their countries of origin in a responsible and principled manner. On 24 May 2024, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1260 on Asset Recovery and Confiscation, which improves upon its predecessor, Directive 2014/42/EU, primarily in terms of tracing, freezing, and confiscating illicit assets.

However, like the previous directive, the new one still lacks a comprehensive policy framework on asset restitution. Although it now includes a section on the return of assets, it limits this to natural and legal persons who are direct victims of the crimes in question (Article 3 of Directive (EU) 2024/1260). This narrow interpretation excludes the broader population of the country of origin, who are often the true collective victims of large-scale corruption.

Moreover, the Directive remains silent on several critical aspects:

  • How to ensure transparency and accountability in the return and use of assets;
  • How to include civil society in monitoring the repatriation and allocation of funds;
  • How to prevent assets from falling back into the hands of corrupt officials or networks connected to the original laundering.

These omissions perpetuate a legal and procedural vacuum around the proper and ethical management of confiscated assets – one that certain EU member states continue to exploit, in violation of both international norms and the GFAR principles for responsible asset return.

What measures do we propose for the Belgian authorities and the European Union?

We urge the Government of Belgium to return to Uzbekistan the $108 million it has unjustifiably retained from the confiscated assets.

However, this restitution must not be unconditional. We propose two possible approaches:

  1. Conditional Transfer: The funds should be transferred to the Government of Uzbekistan only if it implements a comprehensive anti-corruption reform program, with clear mechanisms for oversight and public accountability. This would ensure that the returned assets genuinely serve the interests of the Uzbek people.
  2. Independent Mechanism: Alternatively, the Belgian authorities could adopt a model similar to that of the Bota Foundation, widely regarded as the best example of responsible asset repatriation to date This mechanism involves the hiring through an open tender of executors in the distribution of returned assets, transparency and accountability in their use, and the participation of local civil society in the discussion and monitoring of projects on which these funds are spent.

In addition, we recommend that the European Parliament and the European Council revise Directive 2024/1260 by incorporating a dedicated section on asset repatriation that:

  • Aligns with the UN Convention against Corruption;
  • Reflects the GFAR principles of responsible asset recovery;
  • Learns from the practices of asset return to date, such as those processed from Switzerland to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria.

Such revisions would help close the existing policy gaps and create a European framework for responsible, transparent, and victim-centred asset return – ensuring that the principles of justice are upheld, and that past wrongs are not repeated under a new guise.

 

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